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Transcript for Lesson 5 Presentation: Does the IEP Provide FAPE? |
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From the day IDEA first became law, one of the most important issues has been "What is this free appropriate public education (FAPE) that we must provide to every child who has a disability?" IDEA itself defines FAPE as: Special education and related services that- |
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This definition is straightforward about "free" and "public". The major questions that arise are over "education" and "appropriate". Special education is usually very broadly construed to include far more than just academics. It includes self-help skills such as toileting, dressing, and eating; all the related services including leisure education, recreation skills, and therapies such as occupational therapy, physical therapy and more; social skills, emotional coping strategies, and so on. However, a child is only entitled to those related services which are necessary to enable him or her to benefit from special education. Special education must address all of the child's unique educational needs. It should be emphasized that FAPE is special education and related services, not regular education and not the general curriculum.
In 1982 the U.S. Supreme Court (Rowley) had to address the question of what is meant, in IDEA, by a "free appropriate public education." The court quoted the statutory definition above with approval, but noted that it does not provide any standard "prescribing the level of education" to be provided for children with disabilities. That, of course, is the central question in implementing IDEA. The school needs to know how much it has to do. The parents want to know the extent of their child's entitlement. This is the context in which we've come to say the student is entitled to a Chevrolet, not a Cadillac, education except in a handful of states which have a higher standard. |
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In determining the level (amount) of education required by FAPE, the Supreme Court rejected several possible standards that had been urged--including education to "maximize each child's potential," education "equal to that provided non-disabled" children, and education to result in self-sufficiency.
What the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held in Rowley is that FAPE is provided by (1) personalized instruction with sufficient services to (2) permit the child to benefit educationally and (3) an IEP that has been formulated in a procedurally correct way. In one of the most widely and blatantly ignored holdings ever issued by the Supreme Court, it also said, "If the child is being educated in the regular classrooms ... [a FAPE] should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade." Courts applying Rowley since 1982 have made it clear they must and do read this to mean "real" passing grades and "legitimate" grade advancement. For example, Hall specifically noted that social promotion, a practice so widespread it is now all but indistinguishable from legitimate grade advancement, does not count as "advancing from grade to grade." So, to paraphrase the U.S. Supreme Court and scores of lower court decisions, FAPE means: |
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Educational Benefits The next question, and frequently the crucial question, is how much educational benefit a student is entitled to receive. The U.S. Supreme Court answered the "how much educational benefit" question only for those disabled children who are placed in regular classes. Lower courts have since emphasized that for other children, the amount of benefit required by FAPE is (1) an individualized determination for every child and (2) it must take into account the ability level of the child. The amount of progress (benefit) a child has made is frequently critical to determining whether FAPE has been provided. In recognition of this fundamental fact, IDEA 1997 has put new emphasis and focus on the importance of measuring progress from the present level of performance to the short-term objectives and to the annual goal. |
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A recent decision ( Kanawha) concluded that in order to determine if the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide education benefit
[T]he school district cannot simply provide conclusory statements that the IEP was adequate. The school district must show the following concrete information. First, the school district must show that it set forth the proper elements of the IEP.... Second, the school district must show that the annual goals, benchmarks, and short-term objectives set forth in the IEP were reasonable. The goals must be realistic and attainable, yet more than trivial and de minimus. Third, the school district must show that the methodology that it employed was tailored to meet the annual goals, benchmarks, and short-term objectives set forth in the IEP. Stated differently, the special education and related services must be tailored to reasonably accomplish the goals in the IEP (at 610).Unfortunately, all the preceding words about FAPE are somewhat abstract. So let's look at a case or two that can perhaps shed some more realistic and practical light on FAPE. |
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Case Study Fort Zumwalt Nicholas (Fort Zumwalt) attended Hawthorne Elementary School from kindergarten through 3rd grade. He was retained in 1st grade, so he actually spent 5 full years at Hawthorne. His parents put him in a private school from 4th grade on, and the legal issue before the court was whether Hawthorne had provided him with a FAPE. If so, the district will not have to reimburse the parents for their expenses in sending Nicholas to private school. The hearing officer and the district court both found Hawthorne School had not provided FAPE to Nicholas, and the school district appealed the decision again. Following is the dissenting Circuit Court judge's description of Nicholas' achievement. Remember that Nicholas left Hawthorne in 1991, at the end of his 3rd grade year (his fifth full year at Hawthorne). The dispute is over the 1991-92 IEP offered by Hawthorne for his 4th grade year: |
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The district court found that from September of 1989 to May of 1991 Nicholas's word attack skills had not risen above a first grade level, and a standardized test administered in September of 1991 revealed that his reading proficiency ranked in the second to ninth percentile. At the close of his fifth year in the Fort Zumwalt School District, Nicholas Clynes, at the age of ten, still did not know the alphabet, could not recite the days of the week, and could not identify the months of year. It is true, as the majority points out, that Fort Zumwalt promoted Nicholas to the fourth grade, but it is notable that in third grade Nicholas did not receive a grade above a "C." By the end of the year, Nicholas had failed Spelling and had managed to raise a failing grade in Reading for the third quarter to a "D" for the final quarter.Given these facts, as established by the hearing office and the district court, here is what the 8th Circuit appellate majority decided: After studying the underlying factual findings of the district court in light of the record and legal standards under IDEA, we conclude that the school district did offer Nicholas a free appropriate public education as required by Congress. Although Nicholas may well have benefited more from his education at Churchill than at Hawthorne, and he did not read as well as his non-disabled peers or as he parents hoped, IDEA does not require the best possible education or superior results. The statutory goal is to make sure that every affected student receive a publicly funded education that benefits the student. Nicholas' record at Hawthorne indicates that he was making progress and that the 1991-92 IEP would have provided educational benefit to him. Despite his learning disabilities in reading and math, Nicholas earned passing marks in third grade and mostly C's in mathematics. Although Nicholas did not have well developed word attack skills, his overall reading skills had improved, and he had been promoted to fourth grade just before his parents removed him from Hawthorne. The 1991-92 IEP called for Nicholas to spend over one quarter of each school day in the specialized learning disabled classroom in order to address his disabilities, double the amount of the previous year. The Hawthorne IEP set goals in word recognition, comprehension, language skills and math, and the specialized education provided was reasonably calculated to enable him to benefit from his public education. [citations omitted] (Fort Zumwalt, supra at 613)While this majority opinion (above) is the law of the case, the dissenting judge has a very different view: I agree with the [hearing officer] and the district court that the IEP for 1991-92 was not designed to provide "personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit [Nicholas] to benefit educationally from that instruction." By submitting an IEP substantially similar to others that had previously produced so few positive results, and by exhibiting an unwillingness to explore any different approaches, Fort Zumwalt did not extend to Nicholas the free and appropriate education mandated by IDEA. To be sure, Nicholas was steadily advancing from grade to grade in the Fort Zumwalt schools, and the Supreme Court has stressed that "[t]he grading and advancement system ... constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit," but Nicholas's achievements, particularly in the area of reading skills, can at best be described as trivial. This cannot be the sort of education Congress had in mind when it enacted IDEA. [citations omitted] (Fort Zumwalt dissent, supra at 617)When appellate judges disagree so sharply on whether Nicholas had received FAPE from Hawthorne school, it shouldn't be surprising that we are sometimes confused. |
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Case Study Evans Frank (Evans) situation was somewhat similar to that of Nicholas. During the 1993-94 school year, Frank was in a seventh grade regular education class at Buckeley Middle School. He was profoundly dyslexic and at the end of that year, he was reading at about a 3rd grade level in spite of a high IQ. His mother placed him at a private school, Kildonan, which uses Orton-Gillingham methodology, and Frank did very well there. Frank's mother went to a hearing to compel the public school to pay for Frank's private schooling. Both the hearing officer and the review officer concluded the district had offered a FAPE to Frank, and, therefore, it did not have to pay for a private placement. However, looking at the same facts, including the proposed 1994-95 IEP, the district court saw things very differently: |
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The testimony and documentary evidence tell a compelling story of a very intelligent, but emotionally vulnerable, child who is at great risk of dropping out of school, despite a demonstrated capacity to succeed academically, socially and emotionally in an appropriate program. The expert testimony establishes that, the nature of Frank's dyslexia in conjunction with his emotional problems, is such that he needs an intensive program of individualized, integrated, multi-sensory, sequential training with students of similar needs. The IEP proposed for Frank is not such a program, and therefore cannot meet his needs.As you can see, hearing officers and judges, as well as parents and school personnel have conflicting views about FAPE. |
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Case Study Nein One of the most thorough analyses of the FAPE issue appears in a recent case, Nein. From kindergarten through fourth grade, Lucas Nein attended an elementary school in the Greater Clark District (Indiana). He was identified in first grade as having a severe learning disability. At the end of 4th grade, afer four years of special education, Lucas' parents placed him in a private special school for students with dyslexia and sought reimbursement for this placement from the Greater Clark School District. In first grade, Lucas' WISC full scale IQ was 95. Nevertheless, in January of 4th grade, Lucas was reading below 2nd grade level and spelling at 1st grade level. In February of 4th grade, Lucas' WISC full scale IQ was 75 (but the school psychologist just let it go, as Lucas wasn't "on top of his game" the day of testing). Eight months later, Lucas was found to be of average ability but achieving at the mid-1st grade level. The IEP at issue in this case was developed in April and October for Lucas' 5th grade year. It said that Lucas had difficulty generalizing the words from his Milestones Reading program (controlled vocabulary) to other materials. The IEP did not provide for "a direct instruction program using an individualized, integrated, multi-sensory teaching method" (Nein at 970). A due process hearing was held in November of Lucas' 5th grade year, and the hearing office (as quoted by the district court) found Greater Clark School District had denied Lucas FAPE: |
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Although the Student did receive educational gains in some areas, and made reported progress of six months per year in the Milestones reading program, the progress was not transferable to other academic or non-academic areas wherein student could read, and the student for all intents and purposes was a non-reader during the his [sic] first four grades within the LEA educational environment.The Greater Clark School District appealed the hearing officer's decision. The district framed the issue: The IDEA provides "elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards," but only "general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Unlike plaintiffs in many IDEA cases, the Neins do not challenge the procedures Greater Clark used to decide upon educational programs for Lucas. They contend instead that Greater Clark failed to meet the substantive standards of the Act, which require a "basic floor of opportunity" for disabled children in the form of "access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child." Id. At 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034.The central substantive issue here is whether Greater Clark provided Lucas with a free appropriate public education under IDEA. (Nein, supra at 971) The school district contended that: |
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The parents said: In order to determine whether Lucas had received FAPE, the court had to address two questions: |
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(1) [W]hat level of educational benefit is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA; and (2) [W]hat is the proper measure of educational benefit? When the Supreme Court addressed the first question in 1982, it held that an IEP is valid under what is now the IDEA if it is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." (Rowley). The Court also held that a state satisfied the requirement of providing a free appropriate public education "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Id. At 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034. ... (Nein, supra at 972)In answering the first question, the court observed that: A recent amendment to the IDEA also offers some insight regarding what level of educational benefit is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. Congress amended the Purposes section of the IDEA in 1997 to state that the IDEA seeks "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)(1998). The stated purpose of preparing a child for employment and independent living supports the Third Circuit's view in Ridgewood that an IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide a child with a meaningful educational benefit. Additionally, Congress' statement that an IEP should be designed to meet a child's "unique" needs reinforces the Supreme Court's holding in Rowley that special education services must be "personalized." See 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034.In reviewing the evidence as agreed upon by the hearing and review officers, the court said that: ... despite Dr. Eglen's "conjecture" to the contrary, Lucas had average intelligence and the ability to process and learn; that the special education services Lucas received at Parkwood Elementary had been effective in some areas but had not been very effective in reading; that Lucas could not read anything outside of the Milestones reading program; that at the end of fourth grade, Lucas's reading skills were at the middle of first grade level; that an expert in dyslexia believed Lucas had "extremely limited growth" while at Parkwood Elementary and was "entitled to more growth than that;" and finally, that Greater Clark personnel did not demonstrate any expertise or extended training in teaching students defined as dyslexic. (Nein, supra at 976).The court reviewed and refuted the school district's claims that they had provided sufficient benefit to Lucas, i.e., a Chevrolet education, while the parents were demanding a Cadillac: At the risk of carrying these metaphors too far, for a student like Lucas, the ability to read is truly the key that opens the door to all other aspects of an education. In terms of the automotive metaphor, Greater Clark was providing the Neins with a Chevrolet without a transmission--even if the engine might run, no power ever reached the wheels. Because the Milestones program produced no transferable progress in three years, as both the initial hearing officer and the Board of Appeals found, the program was plainly failing to provide even a minimally adequate educational benefit. (Nein, supra at 977).After discussing all the cautions courts must observe in resolving issues of education or policy, especially the need to give deference to schools, the court said: Taking all of those cautions into account, however, on facts as extreme as these, where a child with a severe learning disability but significant potential made no transferable progress in three years, and where there was no indication the public school was ready and able to change direction, the limits of "due weight" and judicial deference to school authorities have been exceeded. (Nein, supra at 975).The court also saw through the district's claim that adequate benefit was shown by Lucas' grades (in fact, they were modified) and his promotions (retention was against district policy). In a highly significant ruling, the court addressed the methodology which Lucas needed, according to all the dyslexia experts ("Testimony of the experts on dyslexia clearly establishes that to benefit educationally Student requires an intensive program of individualized, integrated, multi-sensory sequential training," Nein supra at 976). It should be emphasized that this court is, in the year 2000, after the 1997 IDEA Amendments, addressing a methodological issue squarely and head on. In the following lengthy and important excerpt from the case, Ms. Hoeppner is the school's special education teacher who had used a whole language method with Lucas unsuccessfully. Ms. Dakin is one of the experts who testified about dyslexia. [This testimony] does not show that Ms. Hoeppner either had actually implemented Ms. Dakin's recommendations or was planning to do so. Ms. Dakin made numerous recommendations, but the recommendation most at issue here was that Greater Clark implement a direct teaching reading program using multisensory, structured, sequential techniques. Ms. Hoeppner did not testify that Lucas' fifth grade IEP included the use of such a teaching program, or that she was planning to use such a teaching program. In fact, Lucas's IEP does not provide for the use of a direct teaching method or any other particular teaching technique to be used to improve his reading skills. As Ms. Hoeppner explained, because there are never any specific instruction in a student's IEP regarding teaching methodology or technique, Ms. Hoeppner would determine what teaching techniques to use with a particular student by looking at the broad goals contained in the student's IEP. There is simply no evidence in the record indicating that, if Ms. Hoeppner had had the opportunity to implement the fifth grade IEP, she was planning to use a teaching method or technique different from those she had used unsuccessfully with Lucas for the prior three years. |
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In that last excerpt from Nein, Ms. Hoeppner testified that in her school "there are never any specific instructions in a student's IEP regarding teaching methodology or technique" (at 979). Prior to the 1997 IDEA Amendments, the general wisdom was that schools, not parents, controlled methodology, and methodology was not, therefore, put on IEPs. Data from the Individuals with Disabilities Educational Law Reporter's Topical INDEX heading "Educational Methodologies" (volumes 20-28) reveal that districts won 53 of the 79 disputes so indexed. When the 32 cases involving autism are deleted, districts won all but 8 of the remaining 47. A substantial majority of these are hearing decisions. When the new IDEA regulations were issued, the U.S. Office of Education published an attachment analyzing the changes they had made in the regulations. One extremely important change was made in the definition of "specially designed instruction" in which the word "methodology" was added (34 CFR 300.26(b)(3)): |
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With regard to the definition of "specially designed instruction," some changes should be made. The committee reports to Pub. L. 105-17 (1997 IDEA) make clear that specific day-to-day adjustment in instructional methods and approaches are not normally the sort of change that would require action by an IEP team. Requiring an IEP to include such a level of detail would be overly-prescriptive, impose considerable unnecessary administrative burden, and quite possibly be seen as encouraging disputes and litigation about rather small and unimportant changes in instruction. There is, however, a reasonable distinction to be drawn between a mode of instruction, such as cued speech, which would be the basis for the goals, objectives, and other elements of an individual student's IEP and should be reflected in that student's IEP, and a day-to-day teaching approach, i.e., a lesson plan, which would not be intended to be included in a student's IEP. |
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The four cases cited earlier in this lesson (Kanawha, Fort Zumwalt, Nein, and Evans) all illustrate that courts sometimes must deal with methodology. Two major generalizations that emerge from case law and regulatory law on methodology are:
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In interpreting IDEA, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantial standard (Rowley at 205-206). Failure to follow the correct IDEA procedures, e.g., providing full and equal parental participation, is called a procedural error. A substantive error has occurred when the IEP fails to offer the quantity/quality of services required to provide FAPE to that child. Either type of error can result in a denial of FAPE. Loosely speaking, substantive matters refer to the "whats" that a law provides, e.g., appropriate special education and related services in IDEA. Procedural matters are the "hows" or the methods by which the law is implemented. A disabled child's right to attend school is a substantive right; the parent's right to be informed about the availability of special education is a procedural right. The child's right to FAPE is substantive; the parent's right to a hearing over whether the child is getting FAPE is a procedural right. When a district has denied FAPE, it can be required to provide compensatory (extra years or extra services) education or to pay for appropriate private schooling. In a few jurisdictions, the school may have to pay dollar damages to the student who was denied FAPE. So, it is very important to avoid these errors. |
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Common Substantive Errors in IEPs
The major substantive question about an IEP is whether it provides sufficient benefit to that child to constitute FAPE. Courts still struggle with how much benefit is sufficient for a particular child, but a general consensus seems to be emerging. First, there is no doubt that the "type" of standard to be used is "educational benefit,"-- not equal opportunity, not self-sufficiency, not "maximize potential" or anything else. The more difficult issues involve how much benefit a child should receive. To make that judgment, one must consider that child's own intellectual abilities. In other words, "benefit" is a floating entitlement standard which increases as the child's intelligence increases and lowers with lower ability. But beyond that, the courts have apparently split into two camps. Some use descriptions like "meaningful" or "more than trivial" benefit (e.g., the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th circuit courts). Others accept much less, such as "some" or "any" benefit, mere "access" to education, or "floor of basic opportunity" (e.g., the 1st, 8th, and 11th circuit courts). One federal appellate court actually stated that under IDEA, the benefit to which a child with a disability is entitled is neither meaningful nor generalizable. "We in fact do define 'appropriate education' as making measurable and adequate gains in the classroom. "If 'meaningful gains' across settings means more than making measurable and adequate gains in the classroom, they are not required by [IDEA] or Rowley" (J.S.K). Given the general agreement that the child's intellectual ability must be considered in evaluating whether enough benefit has been made available to constitute FAPE, it can be very helpful to project the child's growth in terms of years of progress, years in school, and intellectual ability. If a child has average intelligence, we expect roughly a year's progress for each year in school. If the child's IQ is above average (e.g., 133), we expect more than one year of achievement in a year. If the IQ is below 100, we expect less than a year's achievement in a year. For example, a child whose IQ is about 50 would be predicted to make about half a year's gain in a year. Obviously, these are only crude, ballpark estimates, just as IQ itself is a rough measure. Many factors, such as quality of instruction, make for less than a perfect correlation between IQ and achievement. Among the reasons courts have given for finding that an IEP did not offer sufficient benefit to constitute FAPE are these: |
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Common Procedural Errors in IEPs
Procedural errors in IEP development range in seriousness from "do better next time" to "denial of FAPE." The U.S. Supreme Court said, "... Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard." Rowley, supra at 205. Many cases have held that procedural deficiencies will be overlooked (by hearing officers or judges) unless they deny FAPE to the student, or deny the parent an actual opportunity to participate in the process. Parental participation in every stage of the process is critical and any errors that abridge, limit, or deny that participation can result in a denial of FAPE. This is why preparing a "draft" IEP to present to parents for signature is such a bad practice. When the school is deemed by a hearing office or a judge to have denied FAPE, the parent may be entitled to reimbursement, even for a private school, or the student may receive months or even years of compensatory education at public expense to make up for the time FAPE was denied. Presenting a draft IEP is not the only way parent participation can be limited. Improperly holding meetings without properly notifying the parents, failing to inform parents of their rights, or denying a parent the right to bring others to the IEP meeting are a few of the possible offense that may deny FAPE. Full and meaningful parent participation is so important that, on the other hand, when it is actually provided, it may make up for minor, or technical errors in the IEP development. Among the other serious IEP procedural deficiencies, in addition to denying or limiting parent participation, which courts have viewed as a denial of FAPE include: |
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IEPs must be implemented as written. If that becomes impossible, then the IEP must be revised so that it can be implemented as written. Some schools use "fudge factor" terms such as "as needed" or "if appropriate" to qualify service delivery. Parents often feel such qualifiers are a way to justify not providing a service. In the case of an 8th grader who reads at a second grade level, e.g, the IEP should contain something like "texts and all related content information will be provided on audio tape or read aloud to him." Rather than add "as needed," it would be better to say "whenever the material is written above a third grade level." Such accommodations, modifications or support services must be on the IEP and must be provided. It is essential that everyone who works with the student and who will need to implement any part of the IEP have a copy of at least the pertinent portions of the IEP. These accommodations often apply to times when the student is in a regular education classroom. Behavior intervention plans (BIPs) frequently apply in settings such as the playground, halls, cafeteria or bus, as well as the classroom. Again, it is vital that all personnel who may need to implement any portion of the IEP have a copy of that portion of it. This includes bus drivers, aides and others. |
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A major part of the IEP implementation is the assessment of whether each short-term objective or benchmark has been accomplished. Once that has been assessed, the results must be documented and progress or lack of it reported to parents. In years past, tens of millions of non-measurable goals and objectives have been written on IEPs. Of necessity, they were not and could not have been measured. What actually happened in many places was that just before the annual IEP review the special education teacher dusted off the IEP and hastily wrote a bunch of Ps, P+s, and P-s to show "progress." This must stop. We strongly urge the use of the "measuring stick" for writing goals and objectives, assessing progress, and reporting to parents. It is legally correct, educationally useful, efficient, and it significantly reduces paper work. Let's hear it for Measuring Stick IEPs! |